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Marketization of health and social service organizations 
includes the ideas of privatizing funding streams and com-
mercializing services.1 The use of competing private provid-
ers to provide health services was widely supported by the 
concept of new public management that introduced new 
principles, practices, and regulations into the public sector in 
the 1990s.1 These ideas of competition and customer choice 
have been widely adopted in the long-term care sector and 
have dramatically increased the growth of for-profit nursing 
homes. The provision of long-term care by for-profit provid-
ers, however, is a growing concern. For-profit incentives are 
directly related to poor quality,2–4 where facilities operate 
with lower staffing and more quality deficiencies (violations) 
compared with nonprofit facilities.5–7 In the United States, 
nursing homes with the highest profit margins have been 
found to have the poorest quality.8
Chains of nursing homes (ie, that own or manage 2 or more 
facilities) began to grow in the United States and Canada in 
the l970s, and they became a prominent organizational form in 
the 1990s.9,10 Growth occurred primarily through the acquisi-
tion of existing facilities and other chains.9,11 For-profit chains 
aim to improve profitability by economies of scale, standardiza-
tion of services, brand name recognition and visibility, and 
organizational survival in competitive environments.9–11 
Increasingly owned by large private companies and private 
equity funds, for-profit nursing home chains have changed the 
amount, type, and quality of services delivered.5–12
Study Research Aims
Although previous studies have examined for-profit nursing 
home chains and marketization in individual countries, no 
study has examined the trends and variations across countries. 
This article first presents cross-country comparisons of contex-
tual differences and trends in growth of for-profit nursing 
home chains in Canada, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
and the United States. Second, the study examined the 5 larg-
est for-profit chains in terms of their (1) ownership, (2) corpo-
rate strategies, (3) costs, (4) quality, and (5) accountability. The 
study uses secondary documents from multiple public and pri-
vate sources to describe chains across countries.
These 5 industrialized countries were selected because the 
authors are part of a larger international collaborative study 
of nursing homes with access to extensive documents and 
data from reliable sources. Because of the contextual varia-
tions in demographic trends, market structure, and govern-
ment funding, we expected to find both differences and 
commonalities across the countries. Norway and Sweden 
have similar welfare models and marketization began later 
than other countries so that for-profit nursing home chains 
may have less impact on their nursing home services.
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Background: Growth of For-Profit Nursing Home 
Chains by Country
Canada had an industry of small owner-operated homes which 
began to change with the development of provincial govern-
ment involvement in the licensing and payment for services. In 
Ontario, nursing homes were required to be licensed in 1966, 
and in 1972, hospital insurance was extended to cover nursing 
homes.9 These changes encouraged the development of and 
reliance on for-profit nursing homes and chains because of 
economic restraints on government funding and government’s 
limited role in the regulation and enforcement of quality.9 For 
example, the Ontario government made policy changes that 
favored the growth of chains in the mid-1990s. These included 
accepting low bids for contracts, publicly financed capital fund-
ing, legislation that eliminated minimum staffing standards, 
and a revised payment system that allowed companies to main-
tain their profits without a return to government.13
Norway provides comprehensive health and social care ser-
vices to its population, where hospital services are paid for at 
the national level and municipalities are responsible for pri-
mary care and long-term care (nursing homes, special housing, 
and home care).14 This arrangement to give decentralized care 
responsibility to 429 municipalities was established in l982 and 
supported again in 2011, allowing municipalities flexibility on 
how to plan and organize services. In the late 1990s, inspired by 
new public management and the example of Sweden, the ideas 
of marketization promoted the separation of purchasers and 
providers, free choice, and benchmarking. Although a few 
nursing home services were contracted out in the late 1990s, 
only 7% of Norway’s municipalities had outsourced nursing 
homes after competitive tendering in 2012.14
Sweden also provides health and eldercare services on a 
comprehensive, publicly financed basis for all its citizens 
according to their needs rather than ability to pay. The respon-
sibility to organize care services rests with the 290 highly inde-
pendent municipalities.15 Since the early 1990s, the Swedish 
eldercare sector was influenced by new public management 
with legislation giving local authorities the freedom to deter-
mine their own organization and the ability to contract with 
private providers, which one-third of the Swedish municipali-
ties chose to do in 2012. Since the 1990s, the private provision 
of publicly funded services has grown substantially including 
for-profit providers and chains.15
After World War II, the United Kingdom established the 
National Health Services (NHS) which provided free universal 
health care to the population in hospitals, primary care, and 
community health services, whereas local authorities provided 
means-tested social services including residential and home 
care.16 In the 1980s, the government enacted policies which led 
to the closure of NHS long-stay hospitals and growth of the 
for-profit private nursing home sector. The NHS and 
Community Care Act of 1990 devolved the funding responsi-
bility of long-term care to local authorities and continued to 
transfer previously free NHS care into means-tested social 
care. To manage the constraints of their budgets, local authori-
ties targeted services to those with the greatest need.16 These 
policies contributed to the growth of the for-profit industry 
and chains in the United Kingdom.17 The trends were a prod-
uct of the partial privatization of the NHS in the United 
Kingdom that ultimately resulted in increased costs, less effi-
cient services, and the erosion of the principle of universal ser-
vices free at the point of delivery.17
Nursing homes in the United States grew out of the alms-
house system for the poor in the 1800s, which were converted 
to boarding homes in the 1900s for residents to pay their own 
care, especially after the enactment of the federal Old Age 
Assistance law in 1915 and the Social Security Acts in 1935.18 
Between the 1920s and the 1950s, the number of US nursing 
homes grew dramatically and ownership changed from small 
largely nonprofit providers to most of the for-profit companies. 
After 1965, the growth in nursing homes and the shift to for-
profit companies were fueled by a steady source of revenues 
after the enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
and the Federal Housing Authority loan guarantee program.18 
Major growth occurred in the 1990s with many acquisitions 
and mergers by chains.11,19
Methodology
Specif ic research aims
This descriptive and explorative study had 2 specific research 
aims. The first aim was to describe the contextual differences 
and the privatization and the growth trends of nursing home 
chains in 5 industrialized countries in the 2005-2014 period. 
The second aim was to describe the 5 largest for-profit chains 
in each country in terms of their (1) ownership, (2) corporate 
strategies, (3) costs, (4) quality, and (5) accountability in the 
most recent period of 2015-2016. We included historical data 
on ownership since 2005 where data were available to identify 
trends. In each country, the 5 largest for-profit nursing home 
chains were selected based on number of beds, except in 
Norway only had a total of 4 chains.
Study design and data collection
For the first aim, descriptive data for 2005 and 2014 were 
collected from each country (the most recent available data). 
Background documents were obtained from government 
sources describing the population, nursing homes and beds, 
ownership/management, chains, occupancy rates, and gov-
ernment expenditures. For the second aim, we collected 
descriptive data on the 5 largest chains in each country using 
multiple secondary sources including public and private doc-
uments from government, corporate reports, market reports, 
media reports, and other sources for the most recent time 
period (2015-2016). The secondary sources of data collected 
were cited in the text and tables.
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For profitability, we used standard financial measures 
including both the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
amortization, and restructuring or rent costs (EBITDAR) 
which is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA), which is EBITDAR minus lease 
expenses. Data on quality were only available in the province of 
Ontario, Canada, and the United States. In Canada, govern-
ment reports were used to identify deficiencies (regulatory vio-
lations) to indicate quality. In the United States, publicly 
available government administrative data were obtained to 
examine staffing and deficiencies for each nursing home 
chain.20
Limitations
It should be noted that there were many limitations in the 
quality and the availability of data in each countries and from 
the largest nursing home chains because most data were not 
publicly available. Data from private industry reports could not 
be confirmed and data from the large nursing home chains 
often varied by source. Thus, the findings represented the 
authors’ best efforts of compiling information on companies 
from recent sources.
It would have been desirable to have trend data over a 
longer time period by countries as well as data for the large 
chains. Unfortunately, historical trend data on nursing homes 
chains were not readily available except for publicly reported 
companies. Data on beds and homes were available for some 
chains in Canada and the United States for 2005 from private 
sources (not government) but were very limited for the United 
Kingdom. Some chain data on employees and revenue growth 
from private sources were available in Norway and Sweden, 
and several companies were new since 2005. It should also be 
noted that generally nursing homes do not report on homes 
that are owned and those that are managed so the term owner-
ship in this article includes both homes that are owned and 
managed.
Data analysis
The overall trend data were analyzed separately for each coun-
try and for the 5 largest chains in each country. For each chain, 
we analyzed the following: (1) type of corporate owners and 
changes over time, their organizational structure if available, 
their growth since 2005, and their market share in each country; 
(2) corporate strategies including the separation of property 
from operational companies, diversification in companies and 
services;, location of services, and tax havens; (3) cost informa-
tion including revenues and profitability; (4) quality indicators 
including government sanctions, staffing levels, and regulatory 
violations (deficiencies) (where available); and (5) public 
accountability and transparency in terms of access to ownership, 
financial, and quality information. Finally, the findings in 
each country were compared with identify commonalities and 
differences related to the growth and impact of the 5 largest for-
profit chains and policy issues were discussed.
Findings
Comparative context
All 5 counties experienced growth in the population aged 
65 years and above between 2005 and 2014, with the highest 
proportion of the aged population in the United Kingdom and 
Sweden (20%) (see Table 1). The number of nursing home 
beds per 1000 population, however, declined during period in 
all the countries with the greatest declines in Canada and 
Sweden. In 2014, the United Kingdom had the lowest overall 
rate of beds per 1000 aged population, and Norway and Sweden 
had the highest rates. Occupancy rates were highest in Norway 
(98%) and remained similar between 2005 and 2014 in all 
countries, except in the United States which declined to 82%.
In 2014, for-profit ownership of nursing homes was the high-
est in the United Kingdom (86%) and the United States (70%) 
and substantially lower in Canada (37%), Sweden (18%-19%), 
and Norway (6%) (see Table 1). The proportion of for-profit 
ownership increased in all countries between 2005 and 2014 
except in Canada which fell by 20%. The largest increases in for-
profit ownership were in Norway and Sweden. Government 
ownership of nursing homes fell between 2005 and 2014 in the 
United Kingdom and Sweden and remained similar in Canada 
and the United States. Data on ownership and management 
were combined, and some companies in Norway, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom have contracts with local government to 
manage nursing homes. In 2014, government operation of nurs-
ing homes was 89% in Norway and 79% in Sweden compared 
with about 6% in the United Kingdom and the United States.
In 2014, for-profit nursing home chains were the dominant 
providers in the United Kingdom and the United States com-
pared with 17% of homes in Sweden, 14.5% in Canada, and 
only 4% in Norway (Table 1). The growth in chains occurred 
in all countries where data were available, with a large increase 
in the United Kingdom (from 44% to 64% of homes) and over 
double the percentage in Sweden and almost double in Norway 
since 2005.
Total expenditures for nursing homes remained similar in 
Canada and the United States between 2005 and 2014, whereas 
increasing in the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden (Table 
1). The proportion of nursing home residents funded by gov-
ernment was highest in both Norway and Sweden where 100% 
of residents are funded by government. In Canada, United 
Kingdom, and United States, the percentage of residents 
funded by government decreased slightly between 2005 and 
2014, with the greatest decrease in Canada (from 86% to 77%).
Largest For-Profit Nursing Home Chains in Canada
Ownership
Extendicare was the largest for-profit nursing home chain in 
Canada with 13 562 beds and 101 nursing homes in 2015 
4 Health Services Insights 
Ta
b
le
 1
. 
Tr
en
ds
 in
 n
ur
si
ng
 h
om
es
, b
ed
s,
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p,
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s.
C
A
n
A
D
A
50
–5
2
n
O
R
w
Ay
53
S
w
E
D
E
n
54
–6
0
U
n
IT
E
D
 K
In
g
D
O
M
61
–6
4
U
n
IT
E
D
 S
TA
T
E
S
64
–6
7
 
20
05
20
14
20
05
20
14
20
05
20
14
20
05
20
14
20
05
20
14
P
o
pu
la
tio
n 
>
6
5 
ye
ar
s 
of
 a
ge
 (
an
d 
%
 
of
 to
ta
l)
4 
20
5 
50
1 
(1
3.
0)
5 
58
4 
59
2 
(1
5.
7)
67
8 
0
0
0 
(1
4.
7)
81
2 
0
0
0 
(1
6.
0)
1 
56
5 
0
0
0
5
4  
(1
7.
3)
1 
91
3 
0
0
0
5
4  
(1
9.
6)
9 
20
1 
3
4
5 
(1
8)
11
 1
17
 0
0
0 
(2
0)
36
 7
90
 11
36
4  
(1
2.
4)
46
 2
43
 2
11
64
 
(1
4.
6)
n
o.
 o
f f
ac
ili
tie
s
16
3
0
13
3
4
10
0
2
97
9
A
ro
un
d 
26
0
0 
in
 2
01
15
5
4
8
53
51
4
4
16
 0
32
6
4
15
 6
4
6
6
4
n
o.
 o
f b
ed
s
17
3 
37
6
14
7 
92
6
3
8 
92
9*
40
 1
8
4
10
0 
40
0
5
6
8
8 
71
25
7
20
1 
20
0
21
7 
70
0
1 
71
7 
27
26
4
1 
6
9
4 
4
62
6
4
n
o.
 o
f b
ed
s 
pe
r 
10
0
0 
ag
ed
 6
5+
 y
ea
rs
41
.2
26
.5
6
0.
5
49
.5
6
4.
2
4
6.
4
21
.9
19
.6
4
6.
76
4
3
6.
6
6
4
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
o.
 o
f b
ed
s 
pe
r 
fa
ci
lit
y
10
1.
3
11
0.
8
3
9
42
A
ro
un
d 
40
 (
in
 2
01
1)
5
5
4
5
50
10
7.
16
5
10
8.
3
6
5
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 b
y 
ty
p
e 
(%
)
 
F
or
-p
ro
fit
4
6.
9
37
.4
3.
3 
(2
0
0
9)
6.
2
10
-1
15
8
18
-1
95
8
81
.1
8
6.
3
6
6.
0
6
4
6
9.
8
6
4
 
n
on
pr
ofi
t
22
.3
3
0.
7
4.
6 
(2
0
0
9)
4.
9
2-
3
2-
3
7.
5
8.
1
28
.0
6
4
24
.0
6
4
 
g
ov
er
nm
en
t
3
0.
8
31
.9
92
 (
20
0
9)
8
8.
9
8
6.
6
5
6
79
.1
57
11
.5
6.
0
6.
0
6
4
6.
26
4
C
ha
in
s 
(%
) 
of
 a
ll 
be
d
s/
ho
m
es
12
.4
%
 b
y 
be
ds
51
11
%
 b
y 
ho
m
es
51
17
%
 b
y 
be
d
s5
1
14
.5
%
 b
y 
ho
m
es
51
2.
5%
**
 b
y 
ho
m
es
4%
**
 b
y 
ho
m
es
8%
**
 b
y 
ho
m
es
5
8
17
%
**
 b
y 
ho
m
es
5
8
53
.3
%
 b
y 
be
d
s
4
4%
 b
y 
ho
m
es
70
.6
%
 b
y 
be
d
s
6
4.
1%
 b
y 
ho
m
es
52
.1
%
 b
y 
ho
m
es
6
6
55
.9
%
 b
y 
ho
m
es
6
5
O
cc
up
an
cy
 r
at
es
 (
%
)
9
6.
1
97
.1
9
8*
*
9
8
n
A
n
A
8
9.
6
9
0
8
5.
56
4
82
.4
6
4
To
ta
l n
H
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
in
 U
S
 $
$
8.
7 
B
il 
($
10
.5
 
B
il 
C
an
ad
ia
n)
$
9.
4 
B
il 
($
10
.4
 
B
il 
C
an
ad
ia
n)
$
3.
2 
B
il 
(n
O
K
 2
7 
B
il)
$
5.
5 
B
il 
(n
O
K
 4
6 
B
il)
$
5.
7 
B
il 
(S
E
K
 
50
.3
 B
il)
5
6
$7
.1
 B
il 
(S
E
K
 
62
.8
 B
il)
59
$
8.
7
7 
B
il 
(£
6.
19
9 
B
il)
$1
5.
6
6 
B
il 
(£
8.
4
6
6 
B
il)
$1
12
 B
il6
7
$1
15
.6
 B
il6
7
%
 o
f n
H
 r
es
id
en
ts
 p
ai
d 
by
 
g
ov
er
nm
en
t
8
6
7
7
10
0
10
0
10
0
61
10
0
6
0
58
78
6
6
7
76
5
%
 o
f n
H
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
pa
id
 b
y 
g
ov
er
nm
en
t
74
6
9
8
8
87
9
6
6
0 
(2
0
0
3)
97
6
0 
(2
01
2)
n
A
n
A
6
0
67
6
0
67
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
: n
A
, n
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
; n
H
, n
ur
si
ng
 h
om
e.
*T
he
 n
um
be
r 
fo
r 
20
05
 in
cl
ud
es
 a
 fe
w
 b
ed
s 
in
 r
es
id
en
tia
l c
ar
e 
w
ar
ds
 in
 c
om
bi
ne
d 
nu
rs
in
g 
ho
m
e—
re
si
de
nt
ia
l c
ar
e 
ho
m
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 h
om
es
 w
as
 a
dj
us
te
d 
fo
r 
20
14
 a
nd
 in
cl
ud
es
 a
 fe
w
 r
et
ire
m
en
t h
om
es
 a
nd
 h
om
es
 fo
r 
di
sa
bl
ed
.
**
E
st
im
at
ed
. h
ttp
://
w
w
w
.s
sb
.n
o/
en
/h
el
se
/s
ta
tis
tik
ke
r/
pl
ei
e/
aa
r-f
or
el
op
ig
e/
20
14
-0
7-
08
#c
on
te
nt
; h
ttp
://
ss
b.
no
/h
el
se
/s
ta
tis
tik
ke
r/
pl
ei
e/
aa
r/
20
16
-0
6-
29
?f
an
e=
ta
be
ll&
so
rt
=n
um
m
er
&
ta
be
ll=
27
15
03
; h
ttp
s:
//w
w
w
.s
sb
.n
o/
st
at
is
tik
kb
an
ke
n/
S
el
ec
tV
ar
V
al
/D
efi
ne
.a
sp
?M
ai
nT
ab
le
=
K
os
tH
el
se
T
je
n&
;K
or
tn
av
nw
eb
=
he
ls
es
at
&
P
La
ng
ua
ge
=
0&
ch
ec
ke
d=
tr
ue
; h
ttp
s:
//w
w
w
.fh
i.n
o/
en
/h
n/
el
de
rly
-h
ea
lth
/e
ld
er
ly
-o
ve
r-
65
-y
ea
rs
-in
-n
or
w
ay
—
f/;
 h
ttp
://
ec
.e
ur
op
a.
eu
/e
ur
os
ta
t/s
ta
tis
tic
s-
ex
pl
ai
ne
d/
in
de
x.
ph
p/
F
ile
:P
op
ul
at
io
n_
ag
e_
st
ru
ct
ur
e_
by
_m
aj
or
_a
ge
_g
ro
up
s,
_2
00
5_
an
d_
20
15
_(
%
25
_o
f_
th
e_
to
ta
l_
po
pu
la
tio
n)
_y
B
16
.p
ng
; h
ttp
://
w
w
w
.s
sb
.n
o/
a/
hi
st
st
at
/ta
be
lle
r/
4-
19
.h
tm
l; 
ht
tp
s:
//w
w
w
.s
sb
.n
o/
st
at
is
tik
kb
an
ke
n/
se
le
ct
va
rv
al
/D
efi
ne
.a
sp
?s
ub
je
ct
co
de
=
&
;P
ro
du
ct
Id
=
&
M
ai
nT
ab
le
=
K
os
tH
el
T
je
nn
y&
nv
l=
&
P
La
ng
ua
ge
=
0&
ny
T
m
pV
ar
=
tr
ue
&
C
M
S
S
ub
je
ct
A
re
a=
na
sj
on
al
re
gn
sk
ap
-o
g-
ko
nj
un
kt
ur
er
&
K
or
tn
av
nw
eb
=
he
ls
es
at
&
S
ta
tV
ar
ia
nt
=
&
ch
ec
ke
d=
tr
ue
; h
ttp
://
w
w
w
.s
sb
.n
o/
of
fe
nt
lig
-s
ek
to
r/
ko
m
m
un
e-
st
at
-r
ap
po
rt
er
in
g/
ko
st
ra
-d
at
ab
as
en
.
**
E
st
im
at
ed
.
Harrington et al 5
(Table 2). In 2013, it became a publicly traded company on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). Sienna Senior Living 
Inc., the third largest firm, was also a publicly traded com-
pany. Chartwell Retirement Residences, the fourth largest 
chain, was owned by a trust and had public reporting. In con-
trast, Revera Inc. (the second largest), 100% owned by the 
Canadian Public Sector Pension Investment Board became a 
private company in 2007 and was delisted from the TSX. 
Schlegel Villages (the fifth largest) was privately owned by a 
family. As private companies, Revera and Schlegel Villages 
did not have detailed financial reports. One chain (Schlegel) 
had a holding company and all had complex corporate struc-
tures with subsidiaries and related party companies and/or 
divisions.
Three of the chains had changes in ownership and/or 
organizational structures over the past decade but the 5 chains 
retained the same relative size (rank order) since 2005. Three of 
the 5 companies (Extendicare, Sienna Senior Living Inc., and 
Chartwell) grew steadily in terms of nursing home beds and 
homes primarily by acquisitions and mergers between 2005 
and 2015-2016. Revera Inc. had a reduction in beds and a 
slight reduction in facilities, and Schlegel Villages had a slight 
reduction in beds but doubled its nursing homes between 2005 
and 2015-2016. The largest 5 chains controlled 23.8% of beds 
and 18.9% of nursing homes in Canada.
Corporate strategies
Canadian nursing home chains have been involved in real 
estate investment trusts (REITs). The Extendicare company 
was converted into a REIT (from 2007 to 2012) and then was 
converted to a publicly traded company in 2012. Both Revera 
Inc. and Chartwell jointly owned properties with Welltower 
(New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]: HCN), a REIT that 
owned more than 1400 properties in major, high-growth 
markets in the Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, with $29 billion in assets.21 Three of the largest chains 
have separated their operating nursing homes from their 
property and used leaseback arrangements with property 
companies.
The 5 chains were all diversified in owning retirement 
homes, assisted living facilities, memory care, development 
companies, purchasing services, home health care, and 1 chain 
owned research institutes. Two of the 5 chains provided man-
agement services to their companies and other homes. 
Retirement homes and assisted living facilities were a major 
target for growth primarily because they focused on the private 
pay market and were less regulated in terms of both starting up 
companies and operations.
Reflecting Canada’s sharp overall decline in nursing home 
beds and its low bed to population ratio, compounded by strict 
licensing laws in Ontario, all the nursing home chains showed 
high occupancy rates with little or no market competition. 
These chains have been able to take advantage of the limited 
bed supply and government funding and subsidies to rapidly 
expand their homes and beds. All but one chain operated in 
more than one Canadian province. None of the Canadian com-
panies appeared to be located in tax havens.
Of the 5 largest Canadian for-profit chains, Extendicare 
and Revera owned nursing homes in the United States until 
they divested in 2015. Extendicare in the United States had 90 
nursing homes and more than 12 000 beds (the ninth largest 
US chain) before it sold its homes in 2015.22 The decision to 
sell may have been related to Extendicare’s payment of $38 mil-
lion to the US Department of Justice and 8 states to resolve 
allegations of billing Medicare and Medicaid for substandard 
nursing services and for medically unreasonable and unneces-
sary therapy and entered into a 5-year chain-wide Corporate 
Integrity Agreement with the government in 2014.23
Costs
Revenues ranged from $509 million to $980 million in 
Canadian dollars in the 3 Canadian chains that reported their 
financial data. Their net income showed high rates of return 
(8.8%, 13.2%, and 27.9%) for 2015-2016 (Table 2). These high 
profits had been sustained over time. From 2007 to 2012, 
Extendicare reported an average annual profit margin of 9.6%, 
Chartwell reported 12.6%, whereas Sienna Senior Living Inc. 
(Leisureworld) reported 11.8% from 2010 to 2012 (no table 
shown).
Quality
The quality of the largest for-profit chains was examined in 
Ontario where data were available. Corporate chains made up 
a larger share of the for-profit market in Ontario (82%) than in 
Canada overall and have a strong political influence.24 Many 
chains have their headquarters in the greater Toronto area 
where the province has the largest population, has the TSX and 
a large Toronto financial district, and has a strong infrastruc-
ture for supplier networks that is well integrated with US Great 
Lakes region.
The 5 largest for-profit nursing home chains in Ontario had 
a total of 5759 deficiencies in their 154 nursing homes (37.4 
deficiencies per home) in the 2011-2015 period compared with 
an average of 35.5 for all nursing homes. For-profit homes in 
total had an average of 37.3 deficiencies per home, 35.6 for 
nonprofits, and 33.5 for municipal homes in 2015 (the differ-
ences were not significant).
The findings in this study were consistent with a study in 
Ontario and British Columbia. The study found that for-
profit-chain facilities had significantly higher rates of resident 
complaints compared with nonprofit and public facilities.25 
Another recent study of Ontario long-term care homes found 
that for-profit nursing homes, especially chains, provided sig-
nificantly fewer hours of registered nurse and registered practi-
cal nurse care, after controlling for resident care needs.26
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Public accountability
As noted above, only 3 of the largest chains had public report-
ing so that annual reports were available. Although govern-
ment data on individual facility deficiencies were available for 
analysis by chains, government reports on specific chain own-
ership, costs, and quality were not available.
Largest For-Profit Chains in Norway
Ownership
In 2015-2016, there were only 4 chains in Norway with 26 
nursing homes and 1819 beds (Table 3). Two of 4 Norwegian 
chains were privately owned (Aleris and Norlandia) (although 
Norlandia had private equity owners), 1 (UniCare) was owned 
by a private equity company, and 1 was publicly traded 
(Attendo) with some private equity owners. These large for-
profit chains accounted for 4.8% of total nursing home beds 
and almost 70% of the for-profit nursing home beds.
Since 2005, there has been a gradual shift away from a 
dominance of private equity companies primarily because of 
nursing home scandals and rumors of stricter government 
regulations. In 2011, Adecco, a Swiss-operated for-profit 
chain operating some homes in Norway, was reported by care 
workers, trade unions, and the media to be systematically 
violating worker’s rights for overtime and holiday pay and 
pensions, and staffing levels for unskilled workers were lower 
than their contract agreements. All of Adecco’s nursing 
homes were forced out of the care sector by municipalities in 
Norway in 2011.
After Swedish-based Carema Care also was involved in a 
major scandal in 2011 regarding understaffing and poor care, it 
sold its Norwegian branch of nursing homes to UniCare, a 
Norwegian company formed in 2008. In addition, after 
Norlandia’s nursing homes in Norway were also involved in a 
scandal regarding nonpayment of nursing overtime and staff-
ing issues, its private equity owner sold its shares to the 
Adolfsen Group (another private equity company) in 2011.
The 4 chains were characterized by multiple changes of 
ownership. The Swedish company Attendo was rather typical. 
Originally called Partena Care, it first contracted to provide 
nursing home care in Norway in 1997. Attendo bought Capio 
Care in 2004, a company running 3 nursing homes in Norway. 
In 2005, Attendo was sold to the British private equity fund 
Bridgepoint. Bridgepoint, in turn, sold Attendo to the Swedish 
private equity fund Industri Kapital in 2006. In 2015, Attendo 
became a limited company and publicly traded. Data on growth 
in beds and nursing homes were not available, but all 4 compa-
nies reported a substantial growth in revenues and employees 
over the past 5 to 10 years.
The chains also had complex ownership structures. For 
example, Norlandia reported multiple individual and corporate 
owners, subsidiary companies, holding companies, and related 
companies. A major Norwegian union, Fagforbundet, has 
recently been campaigning for public disclosure of what their 
spokespeople label “the real owners.”
Corporate strategies
The 4 nursing home chains had diversified their services by 
operating companies involved in health and social care, child 
protection, preschools, patient hotels, and other services. They 
each had operations in 2 to 4 countries. Previously Attendo and 
Aleris had reported they were based in tax havens, but current 
data were not available.
Costs
The 4 companies reported employees ranging from 2300 to 
14 500 in 2015-2016 and revenues that ranged from NOK/
SEK 1 to 8 billion. Profit margins (EBITDA) were listed at 6% 
to 9.5% for 3 companies, and 1 company did not report data.
Quality
Following the scandals in for-profit chains described above, the 
city governments of Oslo and Bergen, the 2 biggest cities in 
Norway, decided in 2015 not to renew management contracts 
with for-profits in the care sector. For this reason, the share of 
for-profit nursing home beds in Norway is expected to decline 
in the near future. In contrast to Sweden, nursing home build-
ings and property in Norway are owned by municipalities. 
None of the for-profit chains owned buildings or other mate-
rial assets in Norwegian residential care, which makes it easier 
to end contracts.
Public accountability
Only 2 of the largest chains (Norlandia and Attendo) made 
public reports available in English. The other 2 chains made 
reports available on an industry Web site in Norwegian. Some 
municipal governments have contracts with private companies 
to provide nursing home services, but they do not make owner-
ship, financial, and quality data publicly available on individual 
nursing homes or chains.
Largest For-Profit Nursing Home Chains in Sweden
Ownership
In Sweden, large international corporations increasingly domi-
nate the market. Starting in 2005, these corporations were 
bought up by private equity firms (Table 4). Attendo was the 
largest chain in total beds and the only company that was pub-
licly traded, starting in 2015. Vardaga/Ambea became the sec-
ond largest chain after Carema was purchased by Triton to be 
part of Ambea Group in 2010 through a competitive process 
from the 3i company on a partnership basis with another pri-
vate equity company. In 2011, Carema faced a significant media 
scandal when it was reported to have inadequate numbers of 
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registered nurses, undernourished residents, and a high number 
of resident deaths. The poor quality of care and scandal was 
followed by internal turmoil and employee turnover. Triton’s 
restructured the business and sold underperforming services 
and the rebranded Carema as Vardaga/Ambea, with 2 distinct 
divisions: Vardaga for elderly care and Nytida for disabled care 
in 2013.27 Since then, Ambea Sweden was separated from the 
Finnish Mehiläinen Group into an independent entity and it 
announced plans to become publicly traded in 2017. All the 
companies have a complex ownership structures.
Of all nursing home care in Sweden, 12 934 permanent and 
temporary beds (13.5% of all beds) were provided by the 5 larg-
est chains in 2015. This corresponded to 71.8% of the private 
beds and the 10 largest chains provided 86.8% of the private 
beds.28 Half of the beds in for-profit homes were run by the 2 
largest corporations, Attendo (92 homes, 5024 beds) and 
Ambea (77 homes, 3358 beds) (Table 4).
Attendo had 19 000 total employees, Ambea had 14 000, 
and Aleris had 10 000. The number of employees has more 
than doubled for Attendo, Ambea/Vardaga, Förenade Care, 
and Aleris. Revenues have grown considerably from all types of 
activities and in the Nordic countries since 2004-200529 (see 
Table 4). Data on growth in beds and nursing homes over the 
past 10 years were not available.
Four in the top 5 in 2015-2016 (Attendo, Vardaga/Ambea, 
Förenade Care, and Aleris) have changed names since they 
were founded.29 Norlandia was not active in Sweden in 2005, 
but the company grew rapidly after they purchased a company 
with 28 nursing homes in Sweden (see Table 4). These large 
chains have grown mainly by acquisition of other companies.
Corporate strategies
Nursing home chains increasingly have been building their 
own nursing homes and selling beds to various municipalities. 
For example, Attendo has built its own care homes in coopera-
tion with construction and real estate companies that own the 
properties, and lease the buildings to Attendo, normally for 10 
to 15 years. Attendo contracts with municipalities to provide 
nursing home care and have the municipalities pay for the 
building costs. The building of private homes is a new phe-
nomenon in Sweden. Currently, the 2 largest chains have built 
more than one-third of the privately owned homes, and they 
have another 16 homes under construction.
Previously, virtually all privately provided residential care 
was outsourced after competitive contracting (tendering), 
which made it relatively easy for a municipality to end a con-
tract if they were not satisfied with the quality. If municipali-
ties want to end contracts with privately owned homes, they 
must find new homes for residents, similar to the situation in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
more facilities built by private companies, the more dependent 
the municipalities are on their contribution. Consequently, it 
is more difficult for the government to prohibit profit-making 
in residential care, and a government commission is presently 
studying this issue.
All the 5 largest chains operated in 2 to 4 countries. Three of 
the top 4 companies (Attendo, Aleris, and Norlandia) were 
among the top 4 in Norway, and in both countries, they have been 
increasingly active in other areas such as health care, disability 
services, and recently arrived minors seeking asylum. Three com-
panies (Attendo, Ambea, and Aleris) were previously reported to 
be based on tax havens, but current data were not available.
Costs
Some large companies reported low assets, high debt, and paid 
minimal taxes (eg, Norlandia). Financial data were not publicly 
available except for Attendo (a public company) and Norlandia. 
Revenues for the 5 largest companies ranged from SEK 1.3 bil-
lion to 9.8 billion. Profit margins (EBITDA) for the 5 compa-
nies were reported to range from 6% to 9.5% in 2015-2016. 
These large profit margins have raised political concerns in 
Sweden where a government commission is investigating the 
possibilities of limiting profit-making in welfare services.
Quality
No public data were available on quality in Swedish nursing 
home chains for this study. A recent study of nursing homes 
operated by private equity companies found that they had 
higher revenue growth and profit margins than other nursing 
homes.28 These companies had lower numbers of employees 
per resident and higher proportions of staff employed on an 
hourly basis, but specific differences in quality were not identi-
fied.28 The previous scandals in care quality at Carema (now 
Vardaga/Ambea), Norlandia, and other for-profit homes in 
Sweden, however, suggest that staffing and quality problems 
may be an ongoing concern to the municipalities.
Public accountability
As noted above, 3 of the largest chains (Attendo, Ambea, and 
Norlandia) publicly reported on their companies, and one 
other company made its annual report available on an industry 
Web site. Some municipal governments have contracts with 
private companies to provide nursing home services, but they 
do not make ownership, financial, and quality data publicly 
available on individual nursing homes or chains.
Largest For-Profit Nursing Home Chains in the 
United Kingdom
Ownership
The 5 largest providers of residential beds in the United 
Kingdom (Four Seasons Health Care, Bupa Care Homes, 
HC-One Ltd, Barchester Healthcare, and Care UK Health 
and Social Care Investment) accounted for 35.3% of available 
residential beds in 2015-2016 (Table 5). All except Bupa Care 
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Homes were private limited companies, ultimately controlled 
and owned by private investment and equity groups registered 
in tax havens such as Guernsey, Jersey, and Cayman Islands. 
Bupa Care Homes was owned by the for-profit arm of the 
British United Province Association, a global insurance 
company.
Most of the growth of the large UK chains was in the early 
2000s. Prior to 2008, expansion was driven by mergers and 
acquisitions funded by debt, with private equity groups 
attracted by stable government-funded income, increasing 
property prices of homes and advantageous demographic 
changes in 2015-2016. In 2011, the largest UK nursing home 
chain, Southern Cross (founded in 1995), went bankrupt after 
its purposeful build-up of large debt to fund growth resulted in 
unsustainable debt repayment. Most of Southern Cross’ facili-
ties were sold to Four Seasons making it the largest chain. A 
third of Southern Cross’ facilities were also purchased by 
HC-One Ltd, a new private company founded with equity 
investors in 2011.
Although historical data were not available for Barchester 
and HC-One was a new company, 2 companies showed growth 
(Four Seasons and Care UK) and BUPA had a growth in beds 
between 2005 and 2015-2016. BUPA had a loss in its UK care 
business in 2015 and reported a plan to sell most of their care 
homes (Table 5). The 5 companies all had complex organiza-
tional structures with the most prominent being Four Seasons, 
which reportedly has more than 185 companies with holding 
companies registered in Guernsey and the Cayman Islands.30
Corporate strategies
The largest chains have used sale and leaseback arrangements, 
by splitting the operating and property companies in to sepa-
rate groups and the leasing the property from the property 
companies sometimes at artificially high rates.30 After the 2008 
global financial crisis, with a fall in property prices and income, 
the focus has been on diversification and restructuring—sepa-
rating operations and property ownership and selling of less 
profitable care homes and the development of new care homes 
in more affluent areas. Moreover, recent strategies have been to 
focus on serving the private pay market.
The companies have diversified and expanded into inde-
pendent living and residential care, day care, palliative care, and 
other long-term care services. Some companies also provide 
primary care, hospitals, and clinics. The 5 large companies 
operated homes in England, Scotland, and Ireland, whereas 
BUPA had operations in Spain, Australia, and New Zealand.
All except BUPA Care Homes were private limited compa-
nies owned by private investment and equity groups registered 
in tax havens such as Guernsey, Jersey, and the Cayman Islands. 
For example, Barchester Healthcare was a subsidiary of Grove 
Ltd, registered in the Bailiwick of Jersey where funds can be 
shifted from the nursing homes to chains with holding compa-
nies and subsidiaries in tax haven.30 Moreover, these large 
companies had shifted their financing from equity to debt 
funding where the interest payments are nontaxable and 
deducted before profits are taken.30
Costs
The revenues ranged from 55 million pounds at BUPA for 
its care homes although total BUPA revenues were 2.86 bil-
lion pounds in 2015-2016. Other chains reported revenues 
of 315 to 713 million pounds in 2015-2016. BUPA reported 
a loss of 1.2 million on its care homes and HC-One had a 
3% profit (EBITDA) in 2015. The other 3 companies had 
8% to 9% profits (EBITDA) and 15% to 20% EBITDAR 
profits in 2015.
Quality
Multiple concerns regarding the quality of care homes 
owned by corporate chains have arisen after scandals were 
widely reported by the media in Southern Cross’ facilities.31 
Recently, the Care Quality Commission (2016) care home 
inspection reports found that 9% of homes provided inade-
quate care and 32% required improvement, and the 
Commission has received multiple allegations of abuse of 
the frail elderly.31,32,33 Unfortunately, the Commission’s 
quality reports were not available by owners and by chains.
Public accountability
Because the largest nursing homes are private companies 
(except for BUPA), there were no requirements to publish 
financial data, limiting financial transparency and accountabil-
ity for government funds which pay about half of the revenues 
for care homes. Financial crises in local authority funding for 
nursing home care in the United Kingdom have been reported 
to be exacerbated by the policies that have safeguarded health 
care spending but not social care. This has resulted in large cuts 
in social spending over the 2010-2015 period.30,33 Government 
policy has not attempted to collect data on costs or quality nor 
to limit further growth and marketization of large care home 
chains.30
Largest For-Profit Nursing Home Chains in the 
United States
Ownership
In 2015, the 5 largest for-profit nursing home chains in terms 
of beds in the United States are shown in Table 6. Genesis 
HealthCare was the largest for-profit chain and the only 1 of 
5 listed on the NYSE, although its controlling stock was 
owned by Formation Capital (a private equity company). The 
others were owned by private equity firms including the 
Carlyle Group, Fillmore Capital Partners, and National 
Senior Care Inc. Only Life Care Centers of America (LCCA) 
was privately owned by an individual.29 Over the decade, 4 of 
16 Health Services Insights 
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the 5 largest chains remained in the top 5 in 2015 although 
they changed positions, and Kindred was replaced by LCCA. 
Overall, the 5 largest for-profit chains had 10.3% of all nurs-
ing home beds and 9.2% of homes in 2015. The 4 of the 5 
largest chains (except LCCA) had complex ownership struc-
tures with multiple owners, holding companies, and subsidi-
ary companies.
Corporate strategies
The 4 of the 5 large chains had moved their property owner-
ship to either a separate REIT or a real estate company with 
leaseback arrangements. Their growth strategy was to 
acquire and merge with other nursing homes, and 3 chains 
showed a steady growth in beds and homes between 2005 
and 2015-2016.
All the nursing home chains had diversified horizontally 
to include a full range of long-term care companies and ser-
vices including assisted living, rehabilitation, home health, 
hospice, and other services. One chain established a physician 
group practice to care for long-term care patients and other 
businesses such as dialysis, whereas another offered on-site 
physician services. Three of the 5 chains provided manage-
ment services to its own nursing homes as well as other nurs-
ing homes.
The 5 large chains had nursing homes in 21 to 34 states. 
Each of the 5 chains was incorporated in the state of 
Delaware, known as the most favorable US state in terms of 
taxes (a tax haven). Delaware allows companies to lower their 
taxes in another state by shifting royalties and similar reve-
nues to holding companies in Delaware where they are not 
taxed.34
Costs
The 5 chains had large revenues ranging from $1.3 billion to 
$5.6 billion and 2015-2016. Because of the private owner-
ship by 4 of the 5 companies, only Genesis had to publicly 
disclose its finances and its profits (EBITDAR of 12.4% in 
2015-2016).
Quality
In recent years, all 5 of the largest chains had been charged 
with fraudulent practices by the US Department of Justice 
(USDOJ) and either had made large settlements with the 
government or had pending cases. In 2015, Genesis reached 
a settlement for failure to provide services ordered and 
recorded and a $52.7 million settlement for improper hos-
pice billing and fraud and abuse in its therapy services, and 
it was under investigation for staffing and quality of care 
violations.35 HCR ManorCare was charged by the USDOJ 
for providing unreasonable and unnecessary services to gov-
ernment payers during 2006-2012.36 Golden Living was 
charged with filing false claims for hospice patients and 
reached a settlement for providing inadequate wound care 
in 2013.37 Life Care Centers of America settled a nation-
wide fraud case for filing of false claims for therapy services 
not medically reasonable and necessary (for $145 million 
with monitoring for 5 years).38 SavaSeniorCare LLC was 
also charged with false Medicare billing for unnecessary 
therapy.39
Using federal government data on nurse staffing and defi-
ciencies for all US nursing homes, we examined the 5 largest 
for-profit chains in 2014. Registered nursing (RN) hours per 
resident day were significantly lower in Golden Living and 
SavaSeniorCare facilities than the national average. Total 
nursing hours were also significantly lower in 4 of the 5 chains 
compared with the national average. The 5 largest chains all 
had higher percentages of Medicare postacute patients than 
average so that these patients need more nursing and therapy 
hours than other patients. When staffing hours were adjusted 
for the percentage of Medicare patients, the actual RN hours 
were significantly lower than expected hours in 3 of the chains 
and total nursing hours were lower than expected in all 5 of 
the largest chains. With low staffing, it was not surprising 
that all the chains (except Golden Living) had significantly 
higher quality deficiencies than the national average during 
2009-2014.
Public accountability
As noted above, only 1 of the largest chains had public report-
ing with annual reports available. Although government data 
on individual facility staffing and deficiencies were available for 
analysis for each chain, government reports on specific chain 
ownership, quality, and costs were not available.
Discussion
Despite similarities in the growth of elderly population in all 5 
countries, the number of beds per 1000 over 65 has fallen in all 
countries. These trends and the low occupancy rates in the 
United Kingdom and the United States may indicate a prefer-
ence for alternative services delivered in the home and in the 
community. High occupancy rates in Norway and Canada may 
indicate a lack of competition or a lack of alternative options 
for individuals.
Nursing homes owned or operated by chains were 64% in 
the United Kingdom (with a rapid growth in the last decade), 
56% in the United States, and 17% in Sweden and Canada in 
2014. In the context of the Scandinavian tradition of universal, 
tax-financed care services, centered on public provision, the 
recent wave of marketization, and the increasing role of for-
profit companies in residential care for older people were unex-
pected. Sweden and Norway, however, with fairly similar 
welfare models were not affected to the same extent. In Norway, 
5% nursing home beds were operated by for-profit chains com-
pared with 17% in Sweden. Thus, the growth was considerable 
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given that were no for-profit actors in Scandinavia before the 
beginning of the 1990s.1
Ownership
Table 7 shows the comparisons for the key findings across the 
countries. In the 5 countries, the largest for-profit nursing 
home chains were primarily owned by private equity compa-
nies and investors. The exception was in Norway and Sweden 
where some private equity firms left the market. Overall, only a 
few for-profit chains were found to be publicly traded (2 in 
Canada, 1 in Norway and Sweden, none in the United 
Kingdom, and 1 in the United States). Some of the publicly 
traded companies also had private equity shareholders. Private 
equity companies are managed by partners in the funds for a 
fee or a percentage of the profits where capital gains made by 
the funds are not necessarily taxed. These companies are not 
required to publicly report on their financing and operations in 
contrast to publicly traded companies. There is a lack of clear 
ownership and financial transparency information on the large 
private companies in the 5 countries.
The largest for-profit nursing home chains generally had 
grown over the past decade by purchasing and/or merging with 
smaller companies that often involved a change of ownership 
and names (Table 7). The chains in this study showed a grow-
ing complexity of ownership patterns with many holding com-
panies and subsidiaries.
The findings show that many nursing home chains have 
developed limited liability corporations (LLCs) or general or 
limited-partnership structures to limit the risk of financial loss 
Table 7. Comparison of the largest for-profit chains in 2015-2016 by country.
CAnADA (5 
CHAInS)
nORwAy (4 
CHAInS)
SwEDEn (5 
CHAInS)
UnITED KIngDOM 
(5 CHAInS)
UnITED STATES (5 
CHAInS)
ownership
 Type of owner 2 public, 1 trust 
fund, 2 private
1 public, 1 PE, 2 
private
1 public, 2PE, 2 
private
4 PE, 1 private 1 public, 2 PE, 2 
private
  Multiple ownership 
changes and/or mergers
5 of 5 chains 4 of 4 chains 4 of 5 chains 5 of 5 chains 4 of 5 chains
  growth since 2005 3 of 5 chains 3 of 4 chains 5 of 5 chains 2 of 5 chains 3 chains
 Market share 24% of all beds 5% of all beds 13.5% of all beds 35% of all beds 10% of all beds
Corporate strategies
  Property separate from 
operations
3 of 5 chains Property owned 
by municipalities
Some property 
owned by 
municipalities
5 of 5 chains 4 of 5 chains
 Diversified 5 of 5 chains 4 of 4 chains 5 of 5 chains 5 of 5 chains 5 of 5 chains
 Many locations 1 to 4 provinces 2 to 4 countries 2 to 4 countries 2 to 6 countries 21 to 34 states
 Tax havens none 2 of 4a 3 of 5a 3 of 5 chains 5 of 5 in Delaware
Costs
 High revenues $509 to 
$980 million
nOK 1 billion to 
SEK 8.5 billion
SEK 1 billion to 
8.5 billion
£55 to £713 million $1.3 to 5.6 billion
  High profitability EBITDA 3 = 9% to 28%
2 = nA
3 = 6% to 9.5%
1 = nA
5 = 6% to 9.5% 1 = loss
1 = 3%
3 = 8% to 19%
1 = 10%
4 = nA
Quality
 Low staffing nA nA nA nA 5 of 5 chainsb
  Many quality violations 5 of 5 chains nA nA nA 4 of 5 chainsb
  government legal actions none none none none 5 of 5 chains
Accountability
 Public reporting 3 of 5 chains 4 of 4 chains 4 of 5 chains 1 of 5 chains 1 of 5 chains
Abbreviations: EBITDA, net income before depreciation, amortization and interest expense and income taxes minus lease expenses; nA, not available; PE, private 
equity; public, publicly traded.
aEstimated.
bSignificant difference.
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to the amount invested. This is in contrast to partnerships or 
sole owners, where the owners are personally responsible for all 
business liabilities.30 As Burns et al30 has pointed out, where 
financial risks are limited, there is an incentive for corporate 
risk-taking. This was illustrated with the collapse of Carema in 
Sweden and Southern Cross in the United Kingdom.
Corporate strategies
Most of the large chains had separate legal entities for property 
companies or REITs and care operations (see Table 7). This is 
attractive to investors because the companies can be bought 
and sold separately.30 Taxes for property companies are gener-
ally lower than for other types of companies and interest rates 
on loans, and property rental rates can be artificially inflated to 
benefit the property owners.30,40 In addition, operating compa-
nies with few assets consider that they have protection from 
malpractice litigation and government sanctions particularly in 
the United States, but research is not available on this issue.41,42
Often the large REITs that specialize in nursing home 
chains use triple-net lease agreements that make individual 
nursing homes solely responsible for 3 types of costs: net real 
estate taxes on the leased assets, net building insurance, and net 
common area maintenance.30 These types of lease agreements 
have been problematic for some large chains as in the example 
of Southern Cross’ bankruptcy in the United Kingdom. Some 
chains have leases structured to include a proportion of the 
quarterly net income of the nursing home as a way of reducing 
taxes on profits and lowering the profit reports.40
The largest for-profit nursing home chains are often heavily 
debt financed by obtaining cash through loans from banks or 
investors consistent with previous studies in the United 
Kingdom and the United States.30,40 Interest payments are 
nontaxable and are deducted before profit is declared.30 In 
addition, Table 7 shows that many of the large nursing home 
chains used tax havens, which offered investors low or no taxes 
on profits (except for those chains in Canada).
The findings showed that almost every large for-profit chain 
across the 5 countries owned and operated a range of related 
long-term care companies (Table 7). This allows nursing home 
chains to purchase services from their own related companies to 
enhance profit taking. Using the practice of horizontal owner-
ship, the chains are able to capture a full range of long-term care 
business to reduce market competition and improve corporate 
stability. A few large nursing home chains provided physician 
services to the clients across their long-term care network. 
Other large chains, particularly in Norway and Sweden, were 
found to be expanding into providing preschools as well as 
expanding into mental health, developmental disabilities, sub-
stance abuse, and refugee reception centers. Some companies 
reported a strategy to expand into the private pay market rather 
than relying on government payments for clients.
Some of the large chains in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States offered management services to their 
own nursing homes as well as other nursing homes. By creat-
ing separate management companies or services, the costs of 
management services can be charged to individual nursing 
homes at rates set by the parent company to offset its admin-
istrative costs.5–7 Nursing homes may have higher adminis-
tration costs when they pay their parent companies for 
management services.41
Costs
Clearly, nursing home companies have been attractive to pri-
vate investors because they often have high rates of return. 
Many of the large nursing home chains had revenues in the 
billions of dollars. With a few exceptions, the profits by the 
largest nursing home chains were high ranging from 6% to 
28% across the 5 countries, despite financial market fluctua-
tions (Table 7). The high profit margins were an expectation 
of private investors. One UK industry firm reported criticiz-
ing local governments because payment rates were not high 
enough to achieve the industry’s expected profit margins. As 
Burns and colleagues noted, this has resulted in an industry-
supported narrative demanding greater government funding 
for nursing homes.43
Research has found that private equity companies often 
have higher operating and total income margins, as well as 
higher operating costs compared with other nursing home 
chains, but these may not be financially sustainable over the 
long term.30 A lack of stability in many chain owners and 
investors was found in this study by the frequent buying and 
selling of companies, nursing homes, and businesses in all 5 
countries.
The profits of nursing home chains may be underreported 
and hidden in chain management fees, lease agreements, inter-
est payments to owners, and purchases from related party com-
panies.41 When owners take cash out of nursing homes by use 
of loans, fees, administrative costs, and other methods, the 
profitability margins of companies are hidden.30 Moreover, 
declared profits of chains and their operating subsidiaries can 
be manipulated over time to reduce taxes and pay dividends.30 
Previous studies have found that government payers in the 5 
countries have not established financial limits on administra-
tion and profits and have not required public financial trans-
parency of administrative costs and profits by individual 
nursing homes or their corporate owners.44,45
Quality
Where data were available on quality, the large nursing home 
chains did not provide high-quality services. In Canada, for-
profit homes had poorer quality of care than nonprofits and 
municipal homes based on violations (deficiencies) judged by 
government inspections (not significant).24-25 Four of the 
largest US chains also had significantly more quality viola-
tions than the average nursing homes and they all had charges 
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of fraudulent billing practices pending or settled. The find-
ings of higher deficiencies were consistent with previous 
studies of the poor quality of for-profit chains.6,11,41,46,47 The 
findings also showed scandals regarding quality of care in 
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as well as US 
government legal actions against 1 large Canadian chain and 
the 5 largest chains in the United States for poor-quality and 
fraudulent practices.
In the United States, the 5 largest nursing home chains pro-
vided significantly less registered nursing staff hours and total 
staffing than the level expected based on their resident acuity. 
The findings of low nurse staffing levels, especially RN staffing 
levels, in the largest US for-profit chains were consistent with 
previous studies in Canada, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the 
United States.26,28,48 Because nursing homes are labor-inten-
sive, chains seeking high profit levels often reduce nurse staff-
ing costs, especially RN costs, and cut wages, benefits, and 
pensions.30,31,49 As chains have become major providers of 
nursing home care, we conclude that countries need to focus 
greater attention on collecting and analyzing the quality of care 
and quality oversight of nursing home chains.
Public accountability
Overall, we found a lack of government information on the 
ownership, costs, and the quality of services provided by nurs-
ing home chains. Although Canada and the United States had 
quality data available on individual nursing homes that could 
be analyzed by chain, other countries did not have quality data 
available for nursing homes by owners and chains. When large 
nursing home chains can have such a major impact on the 
access, cost, and quality of nursing home residents, public 
accountability should be given a high priority by local, state, 
and country governments.
Policy and regulatory issues
As large nursing home chains and companies grow in domi-
nance in the marketplace and political arena, countries have 
less control over the amount, type, and quality of nursing home 
and related long-term care services. Because of municipal own-
ership of nursing home properties, Norway is currently able to 
limit the growth of for-profit chains and control its contracts 
for nursing home services. As governments become more 
dependent on large nursing home chains for services, they are 
less able to terminate contracts, remove residents from poorly 
performing facilities, ensure that standards are maintained, and 
control the costs of care.
Governments should reconsider their policies of privatiza-
tion of ownership in the context of increasing costs and quality 
problems. They should focus on the changing needs for owner-
ship, financial, and quality reporting and oversight to address 
the challenges of privatization and marketization of nursing 
home and other long-term care services.
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